Board Size Effects in Closely Held Corporations by Bennedsen, Morten et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Board Size Effects in Closely Held Corporations
Bennedsen, Morten; Kongsted, Hans Christian; Nielsen, Kasper
Publication date:
2004
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Bennedsen, M., Kongsted, H. C., & Nielsen, K. (2004). Board Size Effects in Closely Held Corporations. Cph.:
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2020
CAM 
 
Centre for Applied  
Microeconometrics 
 
Institute of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
http://www.econ.ku.dk/CAM/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board Size Effects in Closely Held Corporations 
 
 
Morten Bennedsen, Hans Christian Kongsted and Kasper Meisner Nielsen 
 
 
2004-25 
 
 
 
 
The activities of CAM are financed by a grant from 
The Danish National Research Foundation 
Board Size Eﬀects in Closely Held Corporations∗
by
Morten Bennedsen, Hans Christian Kongsted and Kasper Meisner Nielsen.
December 2004
Abstract: Previous work on board size eﬀects in closely held corporations
has established a negative correlation between board size and firm perfor-
mance. We argue that this work has been incomplete in analysing the causal
relationship due to lack of ownership information and weak identification
strategies in simultanous equation analysis. In the present paper we reexam-
ine the causal relationship between board size and firm performance using a
dataset of more than 5,000 small and medium sized closely held corporations
with complete ownership information and detailed accounting data. We test
the potential endogeneity of board size by using a new instrument given by
the number of children of the founders of the firms. Our analysis shows that
board size can be taken as exogenous in the performance equation. Fur-
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1 Introduction
The organization of the corporate board has received significant attention
in the media and in the business community not least because of the role
played by the board of directors in Enron, WorldCom and other prominent
business failures in the US and elsewhere. The structure of the board has
strong implications for the governance and performance of firms (Hermalin
and Weisbach, 2003). One crucial aspect of board organization is the optimal
number of directors. Theoretically, based on Mancur Olson’s arguments from
the study of collective actions problems, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch
(1992) have argued that large corporate boards may be less eﬃcient due to
diﬃculties in solving the agency problem among the members of the board.
These authors conclude that small corporate boards should therefore create
more value than large boards. This conclusion is adequately summarized by
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003);1
’The idea is that when boards become too big, agency problems
(such as director free-riding) increase within the board and the
board becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management
process.’
Boards serves many roles in a corporation: it hires and monitor the man-
agement; it provides expert knowledge and business network useful for the
top management; it represents individual owners’ legitimate interest in max-
imizing the return of their investment, etc. etc. To allow for having directors
that have core competencies in each of these areas, it is often necessary to
1Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) p. 13, their emphasis.
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choose more than the minimum number of directors. Hence, a theoretically
negative board size eﬀect should not necessarily be present for small boards
as is also indicated by the emphasis above.
The first empirical study of board size eﬀects is Yermack (1996) who
shows a significant negative relationship between board size and firm value
in a sample of large publicly traded US corporations with board sizes in the
range of 10 to 30. Later studies on publicly traded firms (e.g. Gertner and
Kaplan (1996) and Wu (2000)) have confirmed this negative relationship.
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) analyzed the board size eﬀect in
a sample of almost 900 small and medium-sized closely held corporations
in Finland. Most closely held corporations have between 3 and 7 directors.
They find that there is a significant negative board size eﬀect for boards in
the range of 2 to 7 members. Increasing the size of the board e.g. from 3
to 4 members would lower the returns on assets (RoA) by approximately 2
percentage points according to their preferred estimate.
The empirical literature seems to have found a negative board size eﬀect
for all sizes of board - even the very small ones. This finding is rather striking,
since the theoretical literature points out that the negative eﬀect is expected
to arise only when the board gets too large. In fact Jensen (1993) writes;
’When boards go beyond seven or eight people they are less likely
to function eﬀectively and are easier for the CEO to control.’
In the present analysis we question the negative board size eﬀect on closely
held corporations with small boards. Our departure is in the following ar-
gument: Board size is determined by observed as well as unobserved firm
characteristics. An important determinant of board size (often not included
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in the data) is the ownership structure of the firm. In particular, it is expected
that the number of owners and the distribution of owners do aﬀect board size.
A corporation with a single owner tends to have a smaller board than firms
with many owners. Board members, among other things, serve a distribu-
tional role as agents for individual owners (Bennedsen 2001). Eisenberg et al.
recognize this relationship but they do not have data for ownership structure
in their dataset. Even if detailed information on ownership is available there
remains a more general concern that board size could be correlated with un-
observed determinants of firm performance. This suggests that board size
should be treated as an endogenous regressor in order to estimate its causal
eﬀect on performance.
In a simultaneous equation approach, Eisenberg et al. (Table 3) model
board size as a function of performance, size, age and if the firm belongs to a
corporate group or not, but no account is taken of ownership variables. The
performance equation, on the other hand, models the RoA as a function of
board size, board member payment disturbances, the size and age of the firm,
and the change of total assets as a measure of growth opportunities. The
identification of board size eﬀects in the performance relationship a priori
hinges on a single exclusion restriction, namely the exclusion of the corporate
group dummy. Although this variable appears significant in the board size
equation, the validity of excluding it from the performance equation is crucial
for the interpretation of the estimated board size eﬀect. This is not discussed
by Eisenberg et al.
We reconsider the board size eﬀect using a dataset on 5,555 Danish closely
held corporations with detailed information about ownership and control
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structures, which with respect to firm size and board size are very similar to
the 879 Finnish firms used in Eisenberg et al. Our data set has six times as
many observations and represents the population of closely held corporations
in Denmark.
We solve the potential endogeneity problem in the performance equation
by the use of an instrumental variable approach, which is firmly grounded
in the institutional setting surrounding most closely held corporations and
in addition we explicitly consider the validity of the proposed instruments.
Finding good instruments for board size is known to be a diﬃcult task; we
create an instrument which to our knowledge has not been applied before
in the empirical board literature: We have obtained the names and social
security numbers on all persons who have founded a firm in Denmark and on
all close family members of these founders. Our core instrument for board
size is the number of founders’ children older than thirty years. We show that
the instrument is correlated with the board size of these firms and provide
evidence that the correlation is indeed associated with family considerations.
In addition, we claim that the founders’ family relations can be considered
exogenous in this setting. Having a valid and credible instrumental variable
enables us to empirically address the exogeneity status of board size in the
performance equation and we find that there is little empirical evidence that
board size should be endogenous.
The exogeneity of board size allows us to analyze the relationship between
board size and performance in a much less restrictive framework than the one
chosen by Eisenberg et al. Based on a more flexible model specification we
conclude that there is no empirical evidence of adverse board size eﬀects for
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closely-held firms in the typical range of three to six board members. There
is a significantly negative eﬀect in the minority of firms which are have com-
paratively large boards of seven or more members. Thus, we find evidence of
non-linearity as suggested by the theoretical literature and conclude that the
negative board size eﬀect occurs only when boards get too large as suggested
by Hermalin and Weisbach and Jensen cited above.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we describe the dataset
and compare this to the Finnish data used in Eisenberg et al. Section 3
establishes in detail the source of exogenous variation in board size which
we derive from founders’ family relations. In Section 4 we present the main
results using first a standard OLS based approach, then introducing the
instrumental variables models, and finally estimating a more flexible model
specification. We conclude and discuss our findings in Section 5.
2 The Data
Our data include the population of closely held corporations with limited lia-
bility in Denmark in 1999. The data originate from the annual reports, which
all closely held corporations are obligated to submit to the Danish Ministry of
Economic and Business Aﬀairs. The data include financial items from both
the income statement and the balance sheet, ownership information and the
name and identity of CEO and board members.
Similar to most Western countries the Danish company law destinguishes
between two types of closely held limited liability companies, a traditional
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joint stock company and a less regulated version.2 The two company types
diﬀer substantially in terms of boards, since ’A/S’-companies are obligated
to have a corporate board with at least 3 members whereas it is voluntary to
establish a board for firms incorporated as ’ApS’. We therefore only consider
the population of joint stock companies (A/S) which in 1999 totals 14,103.
We follow the standard selection criteria for performance evaluations and
exclude regulated industries and financial intermediaries from the analysis.
The number of firms thereby reduces to 7,960.3 We further exclude a number
of extremely small firms (primarily firms that were recently established) and
firms that have changed industry or reporting standards. These criteria are
described in the appendix. We end up with 5,555 firms that represent the
population for this analysis.
In addition to the full sample we also examine the subsample of family-
owned firms using the definition of family businesses set up by Bennedsen et
al. (2004) based on current ownership characteristics. They define a firm as
a family firm if members of a single family hold 50 percent or more of the
equity. By this definition more than two-thirds of the firms in the sample
are family firms.
Our main strategy in identifying the causal eﬀect of board size on firm
performance will be based on information that relate to the founders of the
2In Denmark the two types are denoted ’A/S’ and ’ApS’, respectively. The latter is
the Danish equivalent of a US ’S-Corp’ or a German ’GmbH’.
3Inter alia we exclude utilities, financial intermediaries, business services, community,
social and personal service activities which are likely to be regulated industries. Thus, our
sample consists of firms with primary industry aﬃliation within NACE groups 10 through
36 and 45 through 63.
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firms. The founder information is available for approximately one-third of
the firms in the gross sample of 5,555 firms.4 For this sample of firms we are
able to obtain personal information on the founders. The additional data on
founders are from the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency, which is the
agency that handles the registration of all Danish firms. The founder of a firm
is defined as the legal person who filled in the forms and oﬃcially registered
the firm with the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency. Approximately
one third of the firms with personal founders have a single founder and around
90 percent of the firms have 3 or less founders. We consider firms with
ten or less founders in order to limit the importance of special ownership
arrangements with a very large number of individual owners or founders.5 We
collect names and CPR numbers (the social security number in Denmark)
of each founder. We submit the CPR number to the CPR agency in the
Ministry of Interior, the government department that administers the social
security numbers. The agency then provides us with the family relations
including names and CPR numbers of all nuclear family members. In total
we are able to obtain the data on founders and their family for 1,836 firms.
The main reason for the substantial reduction in the number of obser-
vations is that the founder information only is available for firms that have
been incorporated in 1986 or later. Similarly, the information is not available
on firms which have been registrered by other corporations, by law firms, etc.
Some firms have existed in another form before their incorporation date (e.g.
4We obtain an almost equally representation of family firms (with a coverage rate of
34.0 percent) and non-family firms (30.8 percent) in this sample. Whether the information
is available or not should ideally reflect a random sampling.
5This excludes less than .4 per cent of firms with available founder information.
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as ApS firms). These firms may have a registered firm age in the annual
report which pre-dates 1986.6 The requirements that there are at most ten
founders and a further requirement (to be motivated by the IV approach
adopted in Section 3) that the registrered firm age should be 25 years or less
defines a sample of 1,836 observations with the necessary founder informa-
tion.
The gross sample of 5,555 firms can be compared to the sample of 879
Finnish firms analyzed by Eisenberg et al. (1998).7 With an average board
size of 3.7 and median assets of 7,590 the figures for the Danish firms are
comparable to the corresponding numbers of 3.7 and 5,498 (converted to
1999-DKK) for the Finnish firms. Although the mean age of the Danish
firms of 19.5 years is well above the mean age of 10.8 reported by Eisenberg
et al. for the Finnish firms, we seem quite justified in comparing the two
results of the two analyses. However, our sample is not comparable to the
samples used by Yermack (1996) and others to study board size eﬀects in
large public traded firms with much larger firm and board sizes.
Main variables of the two samples and their relationships to board size
can be compared in Table 1. It is clear from the table that both samples
are dominated by small and medium-sized firms. The number of corporate
board members appears to be positively related to firm size as measured by
the assets of the firm and also to the number of owners of the firm. Indeed,
most firms have a very concentrated ownership with an average number of
owners around two.
6This is true for around 8 per cent of the firms with available founder information.
7Approximately 80 per cent of the Finnish firms are classified as active in manufacturing
and trade.
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Table 1 also provides evidence on the raw relationship between perfor-
mance and board size. For both samples there is no visible diﬀerences be-
tween the average returns on assets (RoAs) of firms with 3, 4, 5 or 6 directors.
Firms with 7 or more board members have on average lower RoAs although
it should be noted that the latter category is quite thin. In conclusion, Ta-
ble 1 illustrates that there is no clear pattern of increasing board size being
associated with lower returns on assets in the raw Danish data.
3 Family Structure as Exogenous Variation
in Board Size
We have established that most closely held corporations are small, have few
owners and are family controlled. In the following we argue that exactly the
fact that many closely-held corporations have strong family links provides us
with a valuable source of variation in the governance characteristics that we
will claim is exogenous in terms of corporate performance.
Specifically, the information on the family relationships of the founders
of the firm will be used to establish valid instrumental variables for the re-
lationship between corporate performance and corporate board size. We
treat the latter as being potentially endogenous in the performance rela-
tionship and control for a rich set of determinants of current performance.
Our candidate source of exogenous variation in board size is the number of
founders’ children. Two conditions must be satisfied for the instrumental
variable estimation strategy to work: A systematic relationship should be
established between the founder-related instrumental variable and the gover-
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nance characteristic, in this case the current size of the corporate board; and
the founder-related information in itself should not be related to the current
performance of the firm, given the observable determinants of performance
that we control for. We consider each condition in turn and provide evidence
to substantiate our claims.
When considering the number of founders’ children as a candidate in-
strument the core identifying argument is as follows: The size of the relevant
’pool’ from which current members of the corporate board are selected, is
increasing in the number of founders’ children (above a certain age, taken
to be 30 years). In addition, if a family member is admitted to the corpo-
rate board then–due to “equal treatment” considerations–it is likely that
further family members are added. This creates a systematic tendency for
corporate board size to vary with founders’ family size. Ideally, we would like
this mechanism to explain a significant proportion of board size variations.
Table 2 shows the mean number of founders and founders’ children in
firms with diﬀerent board sizes. The evidence is provided for the gross sample
of all firms and for family-owned firms. The table indicates that as a general
tendency there is a positive relationship between board size and the number
of founders’ children in both samples although the relationship seems most
pronounced in family-owned firms. Whether the overall positive correlation
proves significant also when controlling for other determinants of board size
will be evidenced by results from the first stage of the two-stage least squares
estimation procedure applied in the next section. Since it is mainly family-
related concerns that we expect to produce such a correlation our prior is
that the relationship is statistically significant in family-owned forms but less
11
so in non-family firms.
Next, we need to establish that founder-related information is indeed ex-
ogenous to the performance relationship. That is, conditionally on observable
determinants of current performance, there should be no correlation between
the instrumental variable, in this case the number of founders’ children, and
unobservables that aﬀect the current firm performance. Our main argument
rests on the fact that the founders’ fertility decisions and the decisions on the
current board size are well separated in time. The separation is ensured by
imposing an upper limit on firm age and a lower limit on the age of founders’
children. Specifically, we adopt an upper firm age limit of 25 years and a
lower limit on founder’s children of 30 years.8
Our claim is that once we control for a suﬃciently rich set of characteris-
tics, including information on the distribution of ownership, there will be no
further direct eﬀects of the number of founders’ children on current perfor-
mance. This claim rules out e.g. that a founder can make fertility decisions
based on characteristics of the firm she has founded or plans to found, other
than those already included in the performance relationship. It is in order to
limit the relevance of such “reverse causality” considerations that we impose
the time lag of at least five years between fertility decisions that aﬀect our
founder-related information and the earliest date of foundation of any firm in
the sample. Specifically, the firm age limit of 25 years and the consideration
of founders’ children who are 30 or older in 1999 ensures a separation of five
8By construction, firms in the gross sample are younger than the representative firm in
the population. There could be further systematic age-related diﬀerences when compared
to the full population of closely held corporations.
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years between the fertility decisions that has determined founders’ family
size (the persons included have been born before 1970) and the foundation
of firms which took place in 1975 at the earliest.9
There are of course reasons why the exclusion restriction imposed on
the number of founders’ children could be contestable. Even without any
direct reverse causality link there could be a non-zero correlation between
a founder’s abilities in child-bearing and current unobservables in the per-
formance of the firm. Innate ability in child-bearing and in managing a
firm could be related (most likely positively). On the other hand, there is
a trade-oﬀ between time invested in child-bearing and in acquiring man-
agement skills. A priori, there appears not to be a definite sign for any
correlation.
Another potential source of correlation could derive from the process of
CEO choice in family firms. The pool of management talent is non-decreasing
in family size and if the CEO is chosen within the family, then family size
should impact non-negatively on firm performance. However, the tendency
to choose a family CEO and potentially neglect outside management talent
is also increasing in family size as evidenced by recent findings in Bennedsen
et al. (2004). Again, the net impact–if any–on firm performance appears
ambiguous.
A final consideration in support of our claim that the number of founders’
children is exogenous in firm performance is the fact that the claim is made
9Due to fact that we can only obtain founder data on firms that were registered as joint
stock companies in after 1986 most firms are established in 1986 or later. Thus, for the
majoirty of the firms the time lag between the feritlity decision and the establishment of
the firm is above 15 years.
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with respect to original founders of the firm. They are not necessarily closely
related to the current owners or managers, although 74 per cent of the family-
controlled firms are still owned by at least one of the original founders. The
foundation of the firm in most cases took place years before the period in
which we measure firm performance. Almost 90 per cent of the firms in
the founder sample are five years or older. While the relationship between
founders and current management and ownership is expected to be further
weakened by this separation in time, our identifying strategy seeks to ex-
ploit that board size is a persistent phenomenon and in part determined by
founders’ family considerations.
In conclusion, the main exogeneity assumption is that any eﬀect of founders’
family relationships on current performance runs via the corporate board, not
through other current aspects of the management of the firm. Although the
core of this claim will remain an assumption, we obtain testable overidenti-
fying restrictions when we add further instrumental variables to the analysis.
4 The Link between Board Size and Firm
Performance
This section reexamines the empirical relationship between board size and
firm performance. For comparison with previous literature, we first estimate
the relationship by OLS using standard controls for size, age, and the degree
of diversification of the firm as well as membership of a corporate group.10
We then add the ownership and founder variables available in our data set
10Throughout we include industry dummies at the two-digit NACE level.
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as additional controls. The second part of the empirical analysis uses the
instrumental variable proposed as an exogenous source of variation in board
size, the number of founders’ children. Based on the conclusions from the IV
analysis we then reconsider the performance equation with a more flexible
specification of board size eﬀects in the final subsection.
4.1 Basic Ordinary Least Squares Results
The dependent variable in the performance equation is the return on as-
sets (RoA) of the firm in 1999. This performance measure is known to be
quite noisy although there exists few good alternatives in analyzing the per-
formance of closely-held firms. We enter the variable of main interest, the
number of board members, linearly in the basic specification. Other stud-
ies have imposed a log transformation, e.g. Yermack (1996), or even used a
twice log-transformed version as in Eisenberg et al. (1999). We note that the
range of variation of board size is narrow and, if anything, the unconditional
relationship between board size and performance in Table 1 suggests smaller
eﬀects of absolute changes in board size in small boards than in comparatively
large boards, not larger eﬀects as would be implied by a log transformation.
We will use a linear specification for the main analysis and then explore the
robustness of results in a flexible specification of board size below.
A standard set of controls for firm performance will be employed through-
out the empirical analysis: The number of employees (in logs) and its square
as a measure of the size of the firm; the age of the firm; and a dummy for the
firm being part of a corporate group. A final control variable is a dummy for
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whether the firm is diversified.11
Our rich data set also makes available some variables that are related
to ownership. In particular, we have information on the number of owners.
Ownership distribution - and in particular the number of owners - may have a
direct impact on performance, since it is the main mechanism that aligns the
interest of controlling and non-controlling owners (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon
2000). As is evident from Table 2, most firms indeed have very few owners
with a gross sample average of two. Ownership is represented by a set of
dummy variables for having two, three or four or more owners with single-
owned firms as the reference category. A further firm characteristic which is
related to ownership is the presence of a family CEO. Bennedsen et al. (2004)
point out that most closely-held corporations are family-controlled and find
that family control is associated with a tendency to select a member of the
family as the CEO. In order to control for a potential negative performance
eﬀect of narrowing the pool of potential CEO candidates to the family we
include a dummy for firms with this characteristic.
The final set of regressors control for the number of founders of the firm.
In Table 2 we documented that the number of persons who founded the firm is
clearly correlated with firm characteristics already included in the regression,
in particular the size of the board. Still, there could well be other persistent
determinants of performance which are unobserved and correlated with the
number of founders. In order to proxy for such eﬀects we therefore include
dummy variables for having two or three or more founders in the regression.
11Both Yermack (1996) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) find evidence that more
diversified firms are less profitable.
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Table 3 reports the basic OLS regressions. The regression in column (1)
includes only board size and the standard controls, (2) adds information on
ownership and the presence of a family CEO, and (3) also has the founder
dummy variables. (1) and (2) can be estimated for the gross sample of
5,555 firms whereas the regression in (3) is reported only for the sample
of 1,335 family-controlled firms. Most eﬀects of the standard controls are
consistent across the specifications.12 We find that firm size has an increasing
although concave eﬀect on performance. More diversified firms have lower
profits whereas the corporate group dummy is insignificant. Older firms seem
slightly less profitable than younger firms in the gross sample. The age eﬀect
is not significant in the sample of family-controlled firms which is mainly due
to the fact that firms in the latter sample are selected to be 25 years old or
younger.
The performance eﬀect of changes in board size in the gross sample is
found to be negative although small and insignificant. Adding ownership
information and information on the number of founders does not change
that conclusion. The ownership dummies are marginally significant when
added in column (2) whereas the founder dummies could well be excluded
from the regression in column (3) based on the family-controlled sample.
The consistency of the above results and their ceteris paribus interpre-
tation clearly rely on the exogeneity of all regressors in the performance
equation, including the board size variable. The next section examines the
empirical validity of this assumption.
12Indeed throughout most of the empirical analysis. Only where there are exceptions
from this will it be noted in the following.
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4.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation Results
The main issue is whether board size variations are endogeneous in the per-
formance equation and if any inconsistency would matter materially for the
estimated board size eﬀect. As argued in the introduction, there might be
unobserved performance determinants which are also related to board size. If
that is the case, the OLS results do not identify the causal eﬀect of board size
variations on performance. The fact that the above regressions include a rich
set of controls should be a partial remedy for this problem. To further investi-
gate the exogeneity issue, we will employ our proposed instrumental variable,
the number of founders’ children, as a source of exogenous variation in board
size. Our main identifying argument is that once we have controlled for a
rich set of potential performance determinants, including ownership variables
and the number of founders, then the variations in the number of founders’
children should be unrelated to unobserved firm characteristics.
Table 4 reports instrumental variables estimation results based on the ex-
tended specification of the structural performance equation. Firms included
in this table are family-controlled firms founded no more than 25 years ago,
for which we have valid founder information.
The performance equation is estimated in a two-stage least squares pro-
cedure. The first stage is a regression of board size on the instrumental vari-
ables and on all other exogenous variables in the model. The second-stage
regression then includes the predicted value of board size from the first-stage
regression along with the exogenous determinants of performance. Table 4
contains two sets of results. Column (1) uses the exclusion of the number
of founders’ children from the performance equation to exactly identify the
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performance relationship. Column (2) adds its square as an additional in-
strument. This yields a testable overidentifying restriction.
The signs of most eﬀects in column (1) are unchanged compared to the
extended OLS results in Table 3. Some eﬀects have increased in magnitude
which also holds for their standard errors. The eﬀect of board size is nega-
tive and larger in numerical value than in the OLS regression, but remains
insignificant. The overidentified case in column (2) shows reduced standard
errors but the board size eﬀect remains insignificant.
The relative precision of the instrumental variables estimates clearly rely
on the strength of the instrument applied here. A test of the validity of the
instrument is provided by the test of identification reported in the lower part
of Table 4. This is a test of a significant relationship between the potentially
endogenous regressor, board size, and the instrumental variable, the number
of founders’ children, conditional on the set of included exogenous regressors
in the performance equation. In the case of no significance we would have a
“weak instruments” problem. Staiger and Stock (1997) argue that F -tests of
significance should be at least 5 for an instrumental variable not to be weak in
this sense. The number of founders’ children qualify as a valid instrument on
this criterion with an F -test of identification of 9.70 and a very low p-value.
Having established a significant correlation between our proposed source
of exogenous variation and the size of the board, we can then use the instru-
mental variable to address the potentially critical question of exogeneity of
board size in the performance equation. Table 4 reports the Hausman exo-
geneity test13 of the significance of diﬀerences between the OLS estimates in
13The particular form of the test performed here is a residual-addition test, see e.g.
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Table 3 (which are consistent and eﬃcient if board size turns out exogenous),
and the IV results in column (1) if Table 4 (which are consistent in any case).
Based on the founders’ children instrument there is no evidence that board
size is endogenous in the performance equation as the exogeneity test has a
p−value of 28 per cent. The OLS results are therefore to be preferred on the
grounds of eﬃciency.
The robustness of this conclusion is checked in column (2) by adding the
number of founders’ children squared to the set of instruments. This adds
flexibility to the reduced-form relationship and the test of excluding both
instruments from the first-stage regression is again very significant. The
conclusion that board size is exogenous also remains unaltered. Moreover,
having two instruments and one potentially endogenous variable we can test
one overidentifying restriction which easily passes the Sargan test provided
in Table 4. This adds credibility to the core of the identifying argument we
made in Section 3.
In conclusion, we have established that the number of founders’ children
is a valid instrument for the performance equation. Both the OLS and IV es-
timates of the eﬀect of board size on firm performance are negative although
insignificant. Having a valid instrument we can then address the exogeneity
question raised in the introduction. We find that there is no empirical evi-
dence that the size of the corporate board is endogeneous to the performance
relationship.
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). The test is based on adding the residual of the first
stage regression to the structural performance equation and testing its significance.
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4.3 Flexible Ordinary Least Squares Results
The finding that board size variations can be treated empirically as exoge-
nous in the performance equation allows us to become more flexible on the
functional form of board size eﬀects.14 We apply two diﬀerent approaches:
The first approach uses the fact that board size is an integer to construct
dummy variables for boards of four, five, six and seven (or more) members.
The second approach uses a piecewise linear approach similar to that applied
by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). It specifies a linear relationship be-
tween board size and RoA but allows for diﬀerent slopes in small (six or fewer
members) and large boards (seven or more members). We combine these re-
specifications of the board size variables with the extended OLS specification
from Table 3, column (2). The eﬀects of other performance determinants as
reported in Table 5 are seen to be largely unaltered by introducing a flexible
board size specification.
The unrestricted dummy variable specification in column (1) suggests a
small positive but insignificant eﬀect of boards of five or six members. Boards
with seven or more members are associated with a significantly lower RoA.
The F -test of excluding dummies for small boards of six or less members is
easily accepted. The restricted specification reported in column (2) shows a
strongly significant eﬀect of large boards.
For the piecewise linear approach we allow for a change in the slope of the
board size–performance relationship at six board members. The breakpoint
14See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, section 7.6) for a discussion of potential problems
with IV estimation when the endogenous regressor enters non-linearly in the structual
equation.
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at six is suggested both by the dummy specification and by the unconditional
RoAs reported for each board size in Table 1. Again, the eﬀect is found to
be insignificant in small boards. Increasing the board size appears to be
associated with a significantly lower RoA only in the comparatively large
boards with seven or more members.
The results of the flexible models are thus supportive of the prediction
by Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) that negative board size
eﬀects due to agency problems become relevant in board with seven or more
members. Our findings are also consistent with Yermack’s (1996) finding of
a negative board size eﬀect in boards of seven or more members. On the
other hand, our results are contrary to the findings of Eisenberg et al. (1998)
on two accounts. First, we find no evidence of negative board size eﬀects in
small boards. Secondly, the magnitude of the board size eﬀect in boards of
seven or more members is much smaller than that estimated by Eisenberg et
al. The estimates reported in Table 5, column (4) predict that increasing the
size of the board e.g. from six to seven members would lower the RoA by
somewhat less than half a percentage point. The Eisenberg et al. estimates
an eﬀect of more than two percentage points of a similar change.
5 Discussion
A substantial contribution of this paper is to oﬀer firm evidence that a ma-
jor concern in the literature, that the estimation of the performance eﬀect
of corporate board size suﬀers from endogeneity problems, seems largely un-
founded in our sample of closely-held corporations. In order to substantiate
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this claim we exploited a novel source of exogenous variations in board size
due to family-related concerns of the personal funder of the firm. This instru-
mental variable strategy allows us to address the exogeneity issue directly for
the majority of closely-held corporations that are family-owned. Establishing
a valid instrument allowed us to empirically test the endogeneity of board
size.
Based on the finding that board size variations can be regarded as exoge-
nous in the performance equation we then analyzed a flexible model specifi-
cation. Our results show a picture of board size eﬀects in the performance
of small and medium-sized closely-held corporations that aligns with the
theoretical literature. First, we find no performance eﬀects in closely held
corporations of varying the board size at levels below six members, which is
the typical range of board size in closely held corporations.
Secondly, we find a significantly negative eﬀect of increasing the size of
the boards at board sizes of seven members or more. This is consistent
with the findings of Yermack (1996) on listed US corporations and shows
that a negative board size extends to small and medium-sized closely-held
firms but only to the minority of firms that have comparatively large boards.
The performance of the great majority of closely-held firms shows no signs
of being adversely aﬀected by small increases in the size of their boards.
This finding substantiates a prediction of the theoretical literature, that the
negative board size eﬀect occurs when boards become too large.
Overall, our analysis challenges the existence of a negative board size
eﬀect for small boards in closely held corporations. As theory suggests there
are good reasons not to choose the minimum board size as long as the number
23
of directors does not become too big.
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Appendix A
This appendix describes the criteria we used in the data selection. The
total population of closely held corporations in Denmark totals 14,103 firms
in 1999. We exclude 345 firms that did not report their industry classicifa-
tion. We further exclude 6,143 firms which operate in regulated industries;
utilities (25), financial indermediation, business services and community, so-
cial and personal service activities (6118).15 We further drop 1,404 firms
that were not active in 1998 and therefore did not report book value of as-
sets. Similarly, we exclude 175 firms with no employees and 109 firms that
reported extraordinary profits due to sales of assets in the beginning of the
period. We further dropped 243 firms that changed industry at the two-digit
NACE level or where under bankruptcy before 1999. Finally, we excluded
129 extremely small firms that reported beginning-of-period assets of less
than DKK 1,000,000 (appr. USD 170,000 with 1999 exchange rate). This
leaves 5,555 firms that represent the population for this analysis.
All of the above selection criteria are imposed to avoid any major changes
in valuation principles, firms under restructuring, firms with extreme growth
due to recent establishment, etc. While some of the adjustments could po-
tentially be related to the current performance of the firm, none of the con-
clusions reported in this paper are altered by these selection criteria.
15Number of firms in parenthesis.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on ownership, assets and returns on assets for different board 
size categories 
This table reports the mean and medians number of owners, book value of assets and return on 
assets (RoA) for board size categories ranging from 3 to 7+. Medians are reported in parentheses. 
Gross sample is the full sample of firms used in the analysis (see Section 2), whereas Founder 
information is the sub sample of firms for which we were able to obtain information on the founder 
of the firm (see Section 2 for further details). 
 Gross sample  Founder information 
Board Size n Owners Assets RoA n Owners Assets RoA 
         
3 3,372 1.70 
(1.00) 
11,135 
(6,125) 
0.0770 
(0.0702)
1,243 1.62 
(1.00) 
7,800 
(4,817) 
0.0918 
(0.0866)
4 1,186 2.21 
(2.00) 
33,855 
(7,979) 
0.0783 
(0.0760)
377 2.15 
(2.00) 
54,870 
(6,101) 
0.0903 
(0.0851)
5 649 2.74 
(2.00) 
28,003 
(13,837)
0.0794 
(0.0753)
150 2.70 
(2.00) 
23,909 
(9,235) 
0.0912 
(0.0933)
6 224 3.12 
(3.00) 
153,466 
(24,981)
0.0792 
(0.0713)
42 3.24 
(3.00) 
37,969 
(16,801) 
0.1130 
(0.1095)
7+ 124 3.86 
(3.00) 
311,620 
(63,258)
0.0388 
(0.0535)
24 3.54 
(3.00) 
130,493 
(16,839) 
0.0476 
(0.0483)
         
All 
 
5,555 2.04 
(2.00) 
30,403 
(7,590) 
0.0768 
(0.0716)
1,836 
 
1.88 
(2.00) 
21,075 
(5,499) 
0.0913 
(0.0879)
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The link between founder and the founder’s family characteristics and board size 
This table reports the mean number of founders and mean number of founders’ children aged 
above 30 for board size categories ranging from 3 to 7+. Gross sample is the full sample of firms 
used in the analysis (see Section 2), whereas Family controlled is the subsample of family firms 
where a single family holds a majority of the ownership. Founder information is the subsample of 
firms for which we were able to obtain information on the founder of the firm (see Section 2 for 
further details).  
 Gross sample  
& founder information 
Family controlled  
& founder information 
Board Size n Founders Children  
(Age 30+) 
n Founders Children 
(Age 30+) 
       
3 1,243 2.25 0.92 1,001 2,22 0.91 
4 377 2.37 1.11 231 2,32 1.25 
5 150 2.57 1.33 81 2,59 1.54 
6 42 2.50 1.50 14 2,36 1.21 
7+ 24 2.75 1.75 8 3,38 3.50 
       
All 1,836 2.31 1.02 1,335 2.27 1.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: OLS estimates of board size and firm performance  
The dependent variable is return on assets (RoA). Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics, whereas 
numbers in brackets are p-values. Each equation also includes intercept and industry dummies on 
the two-digit NACE level. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level in a 
two-sided test. 
 
Estimation method 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
A. Board variables    
Board size -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0043 
 (-0.68) (-0.97) (-1.04) 
B. Controls    
Employees (log) 0.0136*** 0.0129*** 0.0216** 
 (3.64) (3.42) (2.11) 
Employees (log, squared) -0.002*** -0.0019*** -0.0044** 
 (-3.33) (-3.22) (-2.02) 
Firm age -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -4E-05 
 (-6.13) (-6.11) (-0.06) 
Diversification -0.0067** -0.0067** -0.0082 
 (-2.07) (-2.08) (-1.19) 
Corporate group 0.0053 0.0064 0.0378 
 (0.82) (0.98) (1.28) 
    
C. Ownership    
Two owners  0.0106*** 0.0140* 
  (2.76) (1.87) 
Three owners  0.0001 -0.0030 
  (0.02) (-0.20) 
Four or more owners  0.0098* 0.0147 
  (1.71) (0.94) 
Family CEO  0.0026 0.0078 
  (0.66) (0.56) 
D. Founders    
Two founders   -0.0019 
   (-0.16) 
Three or more founders   0.0107 
   (1.57) 
    
N 5,555 5,555 1,335 
R-sq. 0.032 0.032 0.070 
    
 
 
 
 
Table 4: IV estimates of board size and firm performance  
The dependent variable is return on assets (RoA). We use Number of founders children aged above 
30 as instrument for board size (see Section 3 for a motivation of the instrument). The table reports 
the second stage from the two-stage-least-squares estimation. Identification is a F-test of the validity 
of the instrument. Exogeneity is a Hausman exogeneity test of the significance of differences 
between the OLS estimates and the IV results. Overidentification restrictions is the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, whereas numbers in brackets 
are p-values. Each equation also includes intercept and industry dummies on the two-digit NACE 
level. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level in a two-sided test. 
 
Estimation method 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
A. Board variables   
Board size -0.0344 -0.0183 
 (-1.19) (-1.07) 
B. Controls   
Employees (log) 0.0178 0.0198* 
 (1.60) (1.87) 
Employees (log, squared) -0.0025 -0.0035 
 (-0.86) (-1.40) 
Firm age 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.34) (0.14) 
Diversification -0.0086 -0.0084 
 (-1.22) (-1.26) 
Corporate group 0.0389 0.0382 
 (1.30) (1.29) 
C. Ownership   
Two owners 0.0672** 0.0153** 
 (2.08) (1.98) 
Three owners 0.0063 0.0013 
 (0.35) (0.08) 
Four or more owners 0.0383 0.0257 
 (1.33) (1.14) 
Family CEO 0.0040 0.0060 
 (0.27) (0.42) 
D. Founders   
Two founders 0.0006 -0.0007 
 (0.05) (-0.06) 
Three or more founders 0.0111 0.0109 
 (1.62) (1.60) 
   
Identification 9.70 7.29 
 [0.002] [0.001] 
Exogeneity 1.16 0.63 
 [0.282] [0.428] 
Overidentifying restrictions  0.94 
  [0.333] 
   
N 1,335 1,335 
RMSE 0.114 0.110 
 
 
Table 5: OLS estimates of board size and firm performance  
The dependent variable is return on assets (RoA). Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics, whereas 
numbers in brackets are p-values. Each equation also includes intercept and industry dummies on 
the two-digit NACE level. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level in a 
two-sided test. 
 
Estimation method 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
A. Board variables     
Dummy for board size = 4 -2.8E-6    
 (-0.00)    
Dummy for board size = 5 0.0021    
 (-0.39)    
Dummy for board size = 6 0.003    
 (-0.37)    
Dummy for board size ≥ 7 -0.0335*** -0.0347***   
 (-2.92) (-3.19)   
Board size   0.0013  
   (0.65)  
Board size * Dummy for    -0.0046*** -0.0040*** 
board size ≥ 7   (-2.96) (-3.14) 
B. Controls     
Employees (log) 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 
 (3.04) (-3.06) (3.04) (3.04) 
Employees (log, squared) -0.0017*** -0.0016*** -0.0017*** -0.0016*** 
 (-2.74) (-2.74) (-2.75) (-2.72) 
Firm age -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (-6.13) (-6.11) (-6.13) (-6.11) 
Diversification -0.007** -0.007** -0.0070** -0.0069** 
 (-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.16) (-2.14) 
Corporate group 0.0064 0.0065 0.0064 0.0066 
 (0.98) (1.00) (0.99) (1.00) 
C. Ownership     
Two owners 0.0100** 0.0101** 0.0098** 0.0100** 
 (2.59) (2.62) (2.56) (2.62) 
Three owners -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0003 
 (-0.10) (-0.05) (-0.15) (-0.06) 
Four or more owners 0.0095 0.0102* 0.0090 0.0099* 
 (1.66) (1.86) (1.57) (1.81) 
Family CEO 0.0026 0.0024 0.0027 0.0025 
 (0.64) (0.60) (0.67) (0.62) 
     
N 5,555 5,555 5,555 5,555 
R-sq. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
     
 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics on regression variables 
This table summarizes the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the 
variables used in the regressions throughout the paper. Panel A shows the statistics for the Gross 
sample, whereas Panel B shows the Family controlled with founder information. Gross sample is 
the full sample of firms used in the analysis (see Section 2), whereas Family controlled with 
founder information is the sub sample of family firms where a single family holds a majority of the 
ownership for which we were able to obtain information on the founder of the firm (see Section 2 
for further details). 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
 
Panel A: Gross sample (n=5,555) 
Return on Assets 0.0768 0.0716 0.117 -0.8400 1.408 
Board size 3.67 3 1.070 3 12 
Employees 37.3 12 311.0 1 18,270 
Firm age 19.5 15 16.89 1 344 
Diversification 0.478 0 0.500 0 1 
Corporate group 0.062 0 0.242 0 1 
Number of owners 2.035 2 1.261 1 16 
Family CEO 0.650 1 0.477 0 1 
 
Panel B: Family controlled with founder information (n=1,335) 
Return on Assets 0.0914 0.0877 0.114 -0.8069 0.5666 
Board size 3.35 3 0.736 3 10 
Employees 14.9 9 34.37 1 763 
Firm age 9.5 9 3.763 1 25 
Diversification 0.410 0 0.492 0 1 
Corporate group 0.018 0 0.133 0 1 
Number of owners 1.543 1 0.854 1 9 
Family CEO 0.942 1 0.235 0 1 
Number of founders 2.271 3 1.065 1 9 
      
 
